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ainy day funds have played an important
role in alleviating the current state fiscal
crisis. This article examines the benefits of
these funds, the various ways in which
they can be structured, and the differences in the struc-
ture and use of these funds in New England.
The cause of the states’ current fiscal crisis is vigor-
ously debated. Some believe that states “spent themselves
into this mess” by chasing rising revenues with unabashed
vigor. The solution to the ensuing difficulties, they say, is
obvious: reduce spending. Others argue that states enact-
ed excessive — in light of their long-term spending needs
and commitments — permanent tax cuts during the
boom years. The solution for these observers is equally
clear: reverse the tax cuts. 
To some extent, both sides are correct. In retrospect,
some states did finance expenditure expansions on the
back of extraordinary (and temporary) surges in revenue.
Still others enacted generous tax cuts without curbing
spending. Common to both arguments is the assertion
that conscious decisions on the part of lawmakers, either
to spend more or to tax less, created the budgetary gaps
of today. But discretionary choices were only part of the
problem. 
Cyclical forces affect state governments just as they do
households and businesses. During a recession, tax rev-
enues generally fall, and expenditures, particularly on
transfer programs, increase. Even if there is no change in
fiscal policy, these two pressures shift budgets toward
deficit. Conversely, during economic expansions, tax rev-
enues increase and transfer payments decline, shifting
budgets toward surplus. 
The federal government can ride out these waves of
recession and growth, running surplus, then deficit, and
so on. State governments cannot. With the exception of
Vermont, all 50 states have some form of balanced budg-
et requirement — when expenditures outpace revenues,
steps must be taken to bring them back into balance.
1
Pro-cyclical state fiscal policy is often the result: officials
raise taxes and cut spending during recessions and lower
taxes and increase spending during expansions. Even if
policymakers wanted to run counter-cyclical fiscal poli-
cies, given their balanced budget requirements, most
would be unable to do so. 
Rainy Day Funds
Rainy day funds are one way states can limit the need
for pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  States can build rainy day
funds in prosperous times to be able to call upon them
during leaner years. These set-asides of tax and other rev-
enues benefit the states themselves and, to lesser extent,
the overall economy.  There are four benefits to consider:
First, drawing on reserve funds may aid an economic
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1  With the exception of Vermont, all six New England governors must sub-
mit a budget in which expenditures are balanced with revenues. If the budget
falls out of balance during the year, states may borrow or take additional sup-
plemental action to achieve balance, but, unlike the federal government, 
they cannot plan on borrowing to cover operating expenses as part of the 
initial budget submission.recovery by lessening the need to raise taxes or cut spending, both of which exert a drag on the
economy. It is estimated that the collective actions of the states to erase their current deficits may
shave 20 basis points (two-tenths of one percentage point) from GDP growth this year and as
many as 40 basis points (four-tenths of one percentage point) next year.
2
Second, a more stable fiscal policy — possible when surplus funds are used instead of tax
increases and/or expenditure cuts — promotes private investment. Volatile tax rates and erratic
spending contribute to economic uncertainty, which inhibits investors, while a stable fiscal poli-
cy is conducive to private investment. Private purchases of plant and equipment are an impor-
tant component of the economy and a critical source of improvement in labor productivity.
Third, evidence exists that reserves help reduce the excess burden of taxes — the language
economists use to describe the cost to society created by tax-induced distortions of private eco-
nomic decisions. One team of researchers found that “states that have rainy day funds are more
likely to cope with fiscal stress through spending reductions than through tax increases.”
3 To the
extent this is true, rainy day funds indirectly promote economic efficiency.
Finally, the presence of reserves potentially improves a state’s fiscal standing with bond rating
agencies, resulting in lower interest payments by the state and a lower cost of capital projects.
The existence of the reserves implies a better preparedness for financial emergencies. A recent
statement on budget reserves by Standard & Poor’s makes this point: “These reserves are accu-
mulated in order to be spent during times of budgetary imbalance and extraordinary economic
events. The last month has highlighted the importance and critical nature of these reserves from
a credit standpoint. Given this period of economic uncertainty, a balanced approach of adjusting
spending and drawing on reserves will reduce year-out structural imbalance.”
4
Structuring Rainy Day Funds
In making the decision to save, policymakers incur opportunity costs (i.e., the funds are not
available to increase spending and/or lower taxes). These costs, measured by the depth of reserves,
are the first consideration in structuring stabilization accounts. Are the reserves meant to cover
short-term adjustments or long-term revenue shortfalls — the rainy day or the rainy season? 
If policymakers view reserves as a way to “buy time” — a means of continuing services in the face
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In a field one summer’s day a Grasshopper was hopping about,
chirping and singing to its heart’s content. An Ant passed by,
bearing along with great toil an ear of corn he was taking to
the nest. “Why not come and chat with me,” said the
Grasshopper, “instead of toiling and moiling in that way?” 
“I am helping to lay up food for the winter," said the Ant, “and
recommend you to do the same.” 
“Why bother about winter?” said the Grasshopper.“We have got
plenty of food at present.” 
….When the winter came, the Grasshopper had no food and
found itself dying of hunger…Then the Grasshopper knew: It
is best to prepare for the days of necessity. — Æsopof a temporary dip in revenues — a relatively small
reserve may suffice. However, if lawmakers wish to design
reserves sufficient to weather a significant downturn, the
reserve fund must be significantly larger. 
Several researchers have found that the five percent
rule of thumb advocated by Wall Street — reserves
should equal roughly 5 percent of expenditures — has
been woefully inadequate in smoothing the impacts of
the revenue cycle.
5 Even the deeper reserves accumulated
by several states during the 1990s have proved insuffi-
cient in the face of the massive revenue falloffs of the new 
millennium.
6
If policymakers take a long-term perspective and wish
to build up reserves deep enough to maintain spending
throughout a period of contraction, how severe a con-
traction should they plan for? One as severe as the aver-
age contraction in recent decades? The sharpest contrac-
tion in recent decades? Another Great Depression? And
what percentage of revenues should policymakers try to
cover? What percentage of revenues is vulnerable to cycli-
cal downturns?
7
Besides size, other fund features must also be deter-
mined. Should reserves remain in the general fund as
unallocated surplus dollars, or be sequestered into a
reserve or stabilization account? Should the size of the
fund be capped? What should be the procedures for
withdrawing from and depositing into the fund? What
should be the procedures for replenishment?
8 This list is
not meant to be exhaustive but merely to raise some of
the issues involved.
Rainy Day Funds in New England
As shown in Table 1, the six New England states have
structured their rainy day funds in different ways. All six
have formal budget reserves and are among the 40 states
nationally that cap the overall size of their reserve fund.
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire are
among the nine states nationwide that cap their fund bal-
ance at 10 percent of expenditures; Maine is among the
eight states with a cap of 5 to 10 percent of expenditures;
and Rhode Island and Vermont are two of 19 states with
a cap of less than 5 percent of expenditures. Procedures
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Table 1
State Name of Fund Cap Source of  Supermajority Limit on Use Replenishment 
Deposits Requirement
Structural Characteristics of New England’s Rainy Day Funds
Source: Bob Zahradnik and Rose Ribeiro, “Heavy Weather: Are State Rainy Day Funds Working?”Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 13, 2003,
Appendix Table D.
Connecticut Budget  Reserve Fund 10 percent Year-end Surplus None None None
Maine Rainy Day Fund 6 percent Year-end Surplus 2/3 vote of  None None
legislature for
bonds/construction
Massachusetts Commonwealth 10 percent Year-end Surplus  None None None
Stabilization Fund
New Hampshire Revenue Stabilization 10 percent Year-end surplus 2/3 of legislature  None None
Account for all but revenue 
shortfalls
Rhode Island Budget Reserve &  3 percent 2 percent of None None Must  be
Cash Stabilization  revenues annually repaid within
Account 2 years
Vermont Budget Stabilization 5 percent  None None None None
Reservefor deposits, withdrawals, and replenishment also vary.
As shown in Table 2, New England’s states have
drawn heavily upon their rainy day funds during the cur-
rent downturn in revenues:
• Connecticut used its entire $595 million balance to
offset the deficit that emerged in FY2001. 
• Maine exhausted its $144 million balance by the
end of FY2002.
• Massachusetts’ balance has dwindled from a high of
$2.3 billion to $348 million. 
•  New Hampshire’s fund balance has hovered at
around half of its statutory cap.
• Rhode Island, drawing upon the proceeds of tobac-
co securitization, has maintained a reserve balance equal
to roughly 3 percent of expenditures throughout the cur-
rent downturn.
• Vermont’s fund currently stands at just under 2 per-
cent of expenditures.
Without these funds, the budget cuts and tax increas-
es enacted last year and during the current year would
have been significantly larger. (For details of current
budget balancing actions, see the individual state write-
ups in this issue.) 
Conclusions
Rainy day funds, if structured properly, offer signifi-
cant protection from the fiscal impacts of recession.
Despite their potential benefits, however, they raise 
several potential problems:
First, some would argue that the funds create what
economists call a moral hazard problem, the tendency of
a party with insurance against an unfavorable event to
engage in behavior that makes it more likely that the
event will occur. In other words, policymakers may be less
likely to worry about careful planning of expenditures if
they feel that reserves will cover any revenue shortfalls
that arise. Although researchers have examined the
impact of reserves on state savings decisions, they have
not examined this potential problem explicitly. 
Second, the opportunity cost of a large reserve
account may be substantial. Generally speaking, surplus-
es are viewed positively by the public. As these surpluses
grow larger and larger, however, “disutility” begins 
to appear. On one side of the political spectrum, 
many believe that surplus funds should be returned to 
taxpayers — in the form of tax cuts or tax rebates — and
not “hoarded” by government. For these people, a sub-
stantial reserve account is anathema. At the other end of
the political spectrum are people who believe that many
pressing social needs are currently under-funded. For
these people, a substantial reserve account represents a
significant lost opportunity to increase spending. In
short, the potential political difficulties associated with
large rainy day funds are not minor. 
Finally, not all state fiscal woes are cyclical in nature.
The increased budgetary demands placed on states by
Medicaid and other health care programs are substantial.
To some extent, the extraordinary revenue run-ups of the
late 1990s masked this problem, but they did not allevi-
ate it. A host of other spending demands arising from an
aging infrastructure, rising education costs, and crowded
prison systems are additionally straining state coffers.
These are structural problems requiring solutions beyond
smoothing the cyclical volatility of revenues. 
Despite these cautions, the business cycle will roll on,
and states with a means of bracing themselves against 
its waves of boom and bust will find themselves in more
comfortable circumstances than those without.
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Table 2
Connecticut 595 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maine 144 5.4 34 1.3 0 0 0 0
Massachusetts 2,294 10.4 877 3.8 347 1.5 348 1.5
New Hampshire 55 5.2 55 4.7 55 4.6 55 3.9
Rhode Island 80 3.2 82 3.1 82 3.1 85 3
Vermont 43 4.9 14 1.6 18 2 26 1.7
New England’s Rainy Day Fund Balances, FY2001–FY2004
State FY2001 FY2002  FY2003 FY2004 
(Actual) (Preliminary Actual) (Appropriated) (Proposed)
Balance Percent of  Balance Percent of  Balance Percent of Balance      Percent of
($ millions) Expenditures     ($ millions) Expenditures      ($ millions) Expenditures     ($ millions)  Expenditures
Source: FY2001–FY2003: National Association of State Budget Officers, Fiscal Survey of the States, November 2002. FY2004: state budget documents.New England Fiscal Facts Summer 2003 5
Massachusetts
The recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s
hit the Commonwealth of Massachusetts hard. In
response, policymakers raised taxes and enacted sig-
nificant spending cuts. Despite these efforts, the state
was forced to borrow to meet current funding obli-
gations. In an effort to head off similarly painful
actions in the future, officials began building up a
budget stabilization account. 
In explaining his support for the account,
Speaker of the House Thomas Finneran said, “The
boom and bust, the feast and famine, is not a good
thing. . . so you set aside during the good years for
when it’s not going to be so good.”
As steady revenue growth fueled burgeoning
reserve balances, the legislature voted, in a series of
increments, to boost the cap on the account from 
3 percent of expenditures to 10 percent. With this
constraint loosened, the Commonwealth’s rainy day
fund swelled, reaching $2.3 billion by FY2000.
When revenues collapsed shortly thereafter, the legis-
lature began drawing down the account.  Roughly $2
billion in savings was used, with about $350 million
left as of FY2003.  Massachusetts is one of only a few
states with reserves left on hand. 
Case Study
A Tale of Two States










Rainy Day Fund Balances as a Percent of General Spending
Massachusetts & Connecticut, FY1990–FY2002   
Percent of General Expenditures
Connecticut
Connecticut followed a different path. During the
recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s, officials
quickly drained Connecticut’s rainy day fund to cover
deep deficits. By 1991, with no reserves left, the state
was forced to borrow $1 billion to balance its budget. 
Burdened with a high debt load and faced with 
modest economic recovery through the early 1990s,
Connecticut did not begin making annual deposits into
its reserve account until 1995. By 2001, these annual
deposits totaled roughly $600 million, or about 5 per-
cent of general fund spending.  When a new recession
hit, revenues declined precipitously, and Connecticut
fell back into a deficit situation. Policymakers applied
the entire rainy day fund balance toward deficit mitiga-
tion and began issuing “economic recovery notes.” 
In commentary accompanying his proposed bienni-
al budget, Governor John Rowland wrote, “In retro-
spect,...the state should have placed additional 
dollars in a Budget Reserve Fund as opposed to 
concentrating its one-time surplus on debt avoidance
and debt retirement.” Determined to end the cycle, the
governor recently signed into law a deficit mitigation
plan, increasing the state’s reserve cap to 10 percent of 
expenditures.